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L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /089 W
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R 170813Z FEB 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2639
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USNATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
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USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0063

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FEBRUARY 16 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 160TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,
WHICH WAS HELD ON FEBRUARY 16 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF
GDR REP (OESER), NETHERLANDS REP (DE VOS) DELIVERED THE ONLY
FORMAL STATEMENT. IN HIS PRESENTATION, DE VOS PRESSED
THE CASE FOR AN OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON THE
PRINCIPLE OF PARITY. HE ALSO HIGHLIGHTED INCONSISTENCIES
BETWEEN PRIOR EASTERN BEHAVIOR AND EASTERN CLAIMS, MADE
SINCE THE EAST TABLED DATA IN JUNE 1976, THAT NEAR PARITY
ALREADY EXISTED BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY
MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE
NETHERLANDS' STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH
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FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1) THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND
STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY WITHOUT DIMINISHING
THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTICIPANT CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED
BY FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOME WHICH WOULD BE PRODUCED BY
AN AGREEMENT.

2) THE WEST HAS PROPOSED AN OUTCOME DESIGNED TO MEET THESE OBJECTIVES WHICH IS BASED ON THE INHERENTLY EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY--A PRINCIPLE ACCEPTED BY BOTH EAST AND WEST IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

3) AN OUTCOME WHICH CONTRACTUALIZED THE MILITARY SUPERIORITY OF EITHER SIDE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE AS IT WOULD INTENSIFY THE EXISTING INSTABILITY AND COULD INCREASE THE RISK OF CONFLICT.

4) WHILE IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO SEEK PARITY IN ALL TYPES OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, THE WEST HAS SOUGHT ONLY TO DEAL WITH THE CRUCIAL DESTABILIZING EASTERN FORCE SUPERIORITIES THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND THE REDUCTION OF THE EAST'S SUPERIORITY IN TANKS.

5) IN ORDER TO AVOID DIMINISHING WESTERN SECURITY, THE COMMON CEILING MUST BE COLLECTIVE IN NATURE WITH SPECIFIC CEILINGS ON US AND SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA.

6) THE WEST HAS NOT SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE PARITY IN ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS AS THAT WOULD BE A TASK OF OVERWHELMING COMPLEXITY.
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7) BUT, SINCE THE WEST CANNOT ACCEPT THE CONTRACTUALIZATION OF CURRENT EASTERN SUPERIORITY IN MOST TYPES OF MAJOR ARMAMENTS, THE MOST PRACTICABLE SOLUTION TO ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IS THE MIXED PACKAGE APPROACH THE WEST PROPOSED IN DECEMBER 1975.

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SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /089 W

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R 170813Z FEB 78

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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8) IN DECEMBER 1975, THE WEST ALSO TOOK ACCOUNT OF EASTERN CONCERNS BY PROPOSING TO EXTEND THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCES TO INCLUDE AIR FORCE MANPOWER.

9) THUS, THE WEST HAS PROPOSED A REALISTIC AND EQUITABLE OUTCOME BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY.

10) ONLY AN OUTCOME OF GENUINE MANPOWER PARITY ON THE FACTS CAN ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN SECURITY.

11) EASTERN CLAIMS, MADE SINCE THE EAST TABLED DATA IN JUNE 1976, THAT THERE IS NEAR PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA ARE INCONSISTENT WITH SUCH PAST EASTERN STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS AS:

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A) EASTERN FAILURE TO ACCEPT AN OUTCOME BASED ON PARITY;

B) EASTERN REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THE MERITS OF THE COMMON CEILING;

C) EASTERN FAILURE TO CHALLENGE SERIOUSLY THE DATA ON WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES TABLED BY THE WEST IN NOVEMBER 1973;

D) EASTERN ARGUMENTS, IN THE FACE OF THAT DATA, THAT A DATA EXCHANGE WAS UNNECESSARY AS BOTH SIDES SUFFICIENTLY UNDERSTOOD THE FORCE STRENGTH OF THE OTHER;

E) EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO REFUTE WESTERN STATEMENTS THAT THE EAST HAS A NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN GROUND

FORCE MANPOWER ON GROUNDS THAT THERE WAS AN OVERALL
EAST-WEST FORCE BALANCE IN THE AREA; AND

F) EASTERN CONTENTIONS THAT A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND
FORCE MANPOWER WOULD CHANGE THE EAST-WEST FORCE
RELATIONSHIP TO WESTERN ADVANTAGE.

12. ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE RECORD THAT EASTERN
REPRESENTATIVES PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED THE EAST'S
SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, THEY NOW ARGUED THAT
BOTH SIDES HAVE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER
LEVELS IN THE REDUCTION AREA BUT HAVE PRESENTED NO
CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH CLAIMS.

13. THE DISCUSSIONS TO DATE CONCERNING THE LARGE
DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN COUNT OF
WARSAW PACT FORCES HAVE NOT SUCCEEDED IN IDENTIFYING
THE SOURCES OF THAT DISCREPANCY.
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14. THE WEST HAS FOUND NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT THE
EAST HAS A LARGE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER SUPERIORITY
AND REMAINS CONVINCED THAT WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN
FORCES ARE CORRECT.

15. THE WEST HAS CONDUCTED THE DATA DISCUSSION WITH
FLEXIBILITY AND IN A SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE AND HOPES THAT,
SINCE THERE ARE NO SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENTS BLOCKING
THE WAY, FURTHER DATA WILL SOON BE EXCHANGED.

16. EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MANPOWER
REDUCTIONS TO GENUINE PARITY BASED ON THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION
WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE ATTAINMENT OF
AN AGREEMENT. RESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 feb 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MBFRV00063
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780073-0610
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780242/aaaabjcs.tel
Line Count: 209
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 82f4a2d4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3562779
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FEBRUARY 16 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT AT THE 160TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS HELD ON FEBRUARY 16 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSH
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/82f4a2d4-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014